— Odysseus
An enforced code of conduct is critical to the long term success of any revolution, rebellion, or insurgency
The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 was a graphic and visceral demonstration of the eternal principle that, throughout history, insurgents, revolutionaries, and irregular armies sabotage their own efforts and cause their own eventual defeat when they fail to follow the mandates of jus in bello, righteousness in the conduct of war. Every potential revolutionary or insurgent in the world should learn from this example how their fight should NOT be done. There is a better, more effective, and more successful way to achieve the long term success of a revolution or guerilla operation. Moral behavior on the battlefield enhances the revolutionary guerilla’s cause for success in the long run. Immoral behavior only strengthens their foe.
In Summa Theologica St. Thomas Aquinas asserted that violence must only be used as a last resort. Once in combat, violence was only justified to the extent it was necessary. Soldiers needed to avoid cruelty, and a just war was limited by the conduct of just combatants. However, the behavior of combatants on the battlefield is not only a matter of philosophical ethics. It has a very real impact on both the tactical and strategic outcome of the fight. Hamas either ignored or disregarded this very real impact, thus, likely causing the utter destruction of its movement and the death of all its key personnel.
The following is a general discussion explaining how the moral behavior of irregular forces in combat will impact their long term success.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Irregular armies. Historically, combatants who are not part of the uniformed regiments of a nation-state, are referenced by a number of different terms. The nation-states they wage war against call them everything from “terrorists” to “pirates”. Yet, aside from epithets, there are a number of terms used with varying degrees of precision. Often, the precise term is related to the type of conflict in which they are involved. The types of conflicts where one finds irregular combatants are all multifarious forms of “rebellion” against an existing ruling structure. The nature of the ruling structure determines the name given to the conflict, so these conflicts can include:
- Revolution, which seeks to overthrow a longstanding domestic regime.
- Civil war, which the Romans called a civilization involved in armed conflict against itself.
- War of secession, whereby a geographic region seeks independence.
- Resistance against occupation, whereby, after their rulers lost a war, a local population uses combat to resist occupation by a foreign government.
- War of liberation, whereby the people of a colony use combat to drive out a colonial ruling power and establish local governance.
- Counter-revolution, where the combatants seek to overthrow a governing structure put in place by a recent, successful revolution.
One will note that in each of these conflicts, there is a significant imbalance of power between the warring parties, thus, the irregular forces are usually far weaker than the forces of the power they wish to depose. The irregular forces have been variously called “insurgents”, “rebels”, “guerillas”, “freedom fighters”, “revolutionaries”, “resistance fighters”, “unconventional warfare troops”, and “fifth column forces”. In certain conflicts in history they have taken on local specific names, but they still, generally, fall within one of the aforementioned categories.
For the remainder of this analysis, we will, interchangeably, refer to the smaller force as “guerillas”, “insurgents” or “rebels”. In contrast, we will generically refer to the prevailing power, against which they struggle, the “authority” or “authorities” or the “regime”, because the existing regime exercises control over the geographic territory.
WHY THE BEHAVIOR OF INDIVIDUAL COMBATANTS ARE IMPORTANT
All revolutionary, guerilla, or insurgent operations are conducted against a superior power, which has greater resources, weaponry, and latitude of action than the rebel or insurgent. This is true whether the conflict is a revolution against an existing regime, a war of secession by some territory held by the regime or a war of liberation against an occupying foreign power. Consequently, the guerilla’s fight is more of a psychological one than one of total battlefield dominance.
The guerilla army will not fully take the field or accept the formal surrender of the regime’s general because the guerilla force simply does not have the conventional warfare assets to achieve this result. Rather, the guerilla force’s aim is the psychological defeat of the regime, the breaking of the regime’s will to continue fighting against the insurgency.
If this is achieved, the psychological defeat of the regime results in the success of the guerillas’ objective, be it the withdrawal of the occupational armies, assent by the regime to the secession of the territory in dispute, or the overthrow of the existing regime and its replacement. In every cases, the behavior of the guerillas during the struggle has an outsized impact on their likelihood of success.
The guerilla army’s practices and reputation for treating non-combatants, women, children, the aged or infirm, as well as how it respects places of cultural, religious or historical significance to the world, has a direct impact on how the insurgency is perceived, and, thus, on the four factors most essential to the guerilla’s eventual victory:
- foreign, diplomatic, and material support.
- attitude of the non-combatant citizenry within the disputed territory.
- attitude of the non-combatant citizenry base of the opposing regime.
- support for the legitimacy of the guerillas’ new regime by the citizens of both the disputed territory and by the international community.
TACTICAL IMPACT
There are two schools of thought on the effectiveness of ruthless, horrifying behavior of individual combatants in an army. The older school, which we’ll call the “Genghis Khan” view, is that an army known for committing atrocities will cause their enemies to flee in terror, giving it a strategic psychological advantage. The more modern view is that, when combatants are known for their ruthlessness and brutality, it causes their opponents to fight harder, because they know that they must fight to the death, for they have nothing to left to lose and it is better to die in the battle.
The second view, that brutality and atrocity are counterproductive, is the more modern view because the centuries of warfare since Genghis Kahn have proven it to be the case. Soldiers, who know that they will be treated humanely in captivity, have less reason to endure the unnecessary hardships, suffering, and danger of combat. They are more likely to wave the white flag and surrender.
By World War II, all sides understood the logic of the latter view, and each side directed propaganda to its adversaries that promised humane treatment to surrendered enemy captives. Also, each side induced its own soldiers to fight more fiercely by using propaganda that emphasized the brutality of its enemies to captured soldiers, thus, discouraging surrender.
If a defending soldier knows that the civilians, women, and children that he is defending will be treated humanely, his impetus to continue fighting for mere ideology will be undermined. A soldier, who knows that his family will experience little difference in the outcome, regardless of who wins, will be less likely to fight for mere ideology. Conversely, if he knows his defenseless family behind the lines will be tortured and brutalized if the enemy breaks through, he will fight to his very last breath, and more. Tactically, his desperation makes him much harder and more costly to defeat. The additional level of difficulty to subdue desperate soldiers is not something that a small guerilla army can afford.
When the guerilla or insurgent combatants are known to be considerate, limit their violence to the minimum necessity, and are just, fair, and honest in their dealings, the guerilla benefits from the “Robin Hood” effect. The guerilla acquires a sympathy from the civilian populace, while the authorities’ harsh actions against the guerilla are seen in a bad light. The harsher the measures the authorities direct against the guerillas, the greater is their contrast to the guerillas’ appearance of benevolence while fighting a just cause.
The “Robin Hood” guerilla gains freedom of action, information security, and safety, while the oppressive authorities lose all of the same. Guerillas, perceived as benevolent heroes, find it easier to gain new recruits to their cause. They benefit from their increased ability to turn civilians into sympathetic collaborators who provide valuable intelligence and then continue to spy for the guerillas. When guerillas are respected, they have a greater chance the civilians will not oppose them, they may receive covert medical help when injured, they may be hidden from searching authorities, and may be given supplies when in need.
The insurgent combatants, who are known for rape, brutality, ruthlessness, and disregard for the lives of vulnerable civilians, will be hunted day and night. They will be surrounded by a hostile populace, until even small children will rush to the authorities to reveal their hiding places. A reputation for brutality is a tactical disaster for an insurgency.
STRATEGIC IMPACT
Hamas style behavior has a vast deleterious effect on the strategic aims of the guerilla, as well. During the struggle, the insurgent or revolutionary will seek both diplomatic and material support from outside powers. They will seek safe haven, supplies of materials, weapons, ammunition, and humanitarian supplies such as food, fuel, and medical supplies. A “Robin Hood” force has much more access to foreign help than a horrific “Genghis Khan” force. Even if the world community of governments continues to support the authorities, sympathetic non-governmental organizations, churches, and individuals will offer both overt and covert support to the rebels.
Whether the guerillas’ aim is revolution, secession or liberation from occupation, their eventual goals are the removal of the existing power structure and its replacement with the guerillas’ own organization and structure. For this replacement to take place, the new organization will seek recognition by the international community. It will also seek recognition as the legitimate authority by the civilian population of the territory over which it seeks sovereignty. Neither of these will be forthcoming to a “Genghis Khan” force, whereas there will be clamor to be the first to recognize and support a new government by the benevolent “Robin Hood’s merry men”.
HOW THE REVOLUTIONARY AVAILS HIMSELF OF THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING ROBIN HOOD
In her essays, the philosopher and novelist Ayn Rand sharply criticized the legend and lesson of Robin Hood because she failed to recognize the legend’s true historical nature. She mistakenly believed the oversimplification that Robin Hood “stole from the rich and gave to the poor”, which utterly mischaracterized the historical context of the story. The more accurate reading of the legend is that the “rich” were “rich” because they were part of an illegitimate government that followed a “false king”. The poor were poor because they were looted through taxation by an illegitimate, unjust, government. Robin Hood’s opponents, the Sheriff of Nottingham and his men, were the enforcers for an illegitimate government.
The story of Robin Hood is, clearly, a story of a popular, legendary guerilla leader, fighting a revolution against an oppressive, illegitimate regime. For our purposes, Robin Hood and his men would be considered either revolutionary, or counter-revolutionary insurgents. In the legend, Robin Hood followed the rules for a successful insurgency, by remaining popular with the local civilians and limited his actions to targeting the regime.
It may be counterintuitive that a guerilla army of lawbreakers can be seen as a force for goodness, justice, civility, and benevolence, but this is necessary for them to achieve long term success. Rebels or revolutionaries are, by definition lawbreakers, and must commit acts of violence. Nonetheless, a positive reputation can be accomplished rather simply, if the leaders are vigilant to act in a manner that natural human instincts would universally view as “righteous” rather than “wicked”.
There are two categories of legal restrictions on human behavior. They are known in Latin as malum prohibitum and malum in se. The first category, malum prohibitum, are things that are forbidden by law, not because of any common human understanding of their moral right and wrong, but simply because the authority has forbidden them. Examples include speed limits, taxes, prohibition on the voluntary consumption of certain things, possession of certain items, etc. The second category, malum in se, are the things that all normal humans viscerally understand to “wrong”, regardless of religion, creed, or culture, across the globe, and across time. Examples include causeless murder, mutilation, theft, rape, torture, victimization of the helpless, wanton destruction, etc.
The rebel seeks to overthrow the laws and rules of the existing authority that are both malum prohibitum and malum in se. While the rebel forces, by necessity, consistently and regularly break the laws of existing authority government, they should make every possible effort to avoid acts that would be considered malum in se, and they should be conspicuous in their efforts to do so. Even making sacrifices, losing, and suffering to avoid being forced to commit acts that are malum in se will yield propaganda victories that may exceed the momentary tactical loss of men or material. A rebel who loses his life to protect a vulnerable civilian can become a martyr, which serves the cause even hundreds of years after his death and, in some notable cases, thousands of years.
In the Irish rebellion against British rule, although the Irish Revolutionary Army (“IRA”) was called a terrorist organization and was known for deadly, brutal behavior, its soldiers more or less successfully followed a code of behavior that largely avoided acts that were malum in se. Despite attacking civilian targets with bombs, they called in and gave a general warning of the areas to be bombed, thereby, allowing the authorities to minimize civilian casualties.
The IRA’s strategy leveraged the authorities’ large power differential against itself. If the British failed to warn the public, the resulting fatalities and injuries became their fault and not the bomber’s fault. If the British did warn the public, its information and propaganda network was turned against itself. The vagueness of the warning allowed the IRA to simultaneously shut down far more areas than they could actually place bombs, all the while forcing the authorities to acknowledge that the IRA was humane and trying to prevent unnecessary casualties.
While the IRA was known to use brutality, killing, and even torture, these acts was directed against traitors and collaborators known to be assisting their enemy. Within the context of the propaganda war, that was parallel to the actual combat, these actions were not overly harmful to the IRA, so long as they were internally contained, were not directed at non-combatants, and were perceived to be used only in a fair, just, predictable, manner. Random violence, unwarned and unwarranted violence, and senseless destruction always undermine the public’s perception of the insurgent and his cause. The rebel’s efforts must always be more weighted to the psychological than the kinetic war.
The wise command structure, generals, and field officers should be willing to enforce rigid and harsh discipline on their subordinates to scrupulously minimize acts that are malum in se. The field officers must maintain a zero tolerance policy towards rape, senseless killing, unnecessary brutality, looting, or vandalism of religious or cultural sites. In return, these field officers and their superiors will enjoy a safer operating environment, less committed opposition forces, and a greater likelihood of long term success of their tactical, strategic and historical aims. While useful, a reputation for mercy is optional, whereas they absolutely must maintain a reputation for being “fair” and “just”, to maintain respect and order even within their own troops.
In contrast, Hamas has created a negative object lesson of how its failure to control, or even to actively encourage, its combatants’ individual barbarous behavior, actually weakens and often destroys the objectives for which they claim to be fighting. If barbarous behavior itself is the objective, then Hamas’ political ambitions are merely a false cover for savages engaged in raids for looting, piracy, rape, murder and plunder, that make them the self-declared enemies of all humanity, ultimately destined to be wiped out.
LEGITIMATE TARGETS
A key means by which the “Robin Hood” force can maintain its morally superior position is by careful selection of its targets for attack. To maximize psychological value and to minimize negative public perception, the insurgent forces should only direct their attacks to targets that represent the power and authority of the regime they wish to overthrow. These will be perceived by the public as “legitimate targets”, as opposed to easy but innocent civilian targets. The wise guerilla will prefer to strike government buildings, military bases or outposts, and only kill government officials and armed government personnel. Civilians and foreign observers will find these targets to be legitimate warfare.
A second tier of targets should be police, police stations, courts, jails, prisons, and all other sites, equipment, and personnel connected with the authorities’ maintenance of order and control. Again, these attacks will be viewed in the context of a war of rebellion. However, these targets are less preferable than first tier targets, because they also serve civilians and their need for order, safety, and protection from non-political criminal activity.
A third tier of targets for the “Robin Hood” guerilla forces are economic structures that are critical to the survival of the regime. While it may be necessary to target refineries, power plants, crops, and financial institutions, these attacks will generate the civilians population’s ill will. The more direct the negative impact on the life or livelihood of the individual civilian, the greater the ill will. In general, the civilian population relies on these structures and institutions for its own livelihood, which is separate and distinct from the needs of the authorities. As such, the destruction or disabling of facilities, resources or personnel, associated with economic infrastructure for the regime, but which are heavily needed by civilians, poses serious collateral damage to the guerilla, and the cost/benefit of such attacks must be carefully weighed.
The “Robin Hood” guerilla should never attack a purely civilian target, which has little or no strategic value to the ruling authorities. Thus, the Islamists’ suicide bombings of pizzerias, markets, and schools are a negative example, vicious acts that should never be done. There is little strategic gain from them, but a terrible reputational damage. Reputation is the lifeblood of an insurgency.
The general rule, here, is that the more tenuous the connection is to the authorities, the more backlash the guerilla force will receive in public opinion. Attacks on restaurants, movie theaters, and shopping plazas, all fail to produce any significant tactical gains and are catastrophic to the guerilla’s strategic aims. Such acts of violence against civilians are rightly portrayed as pure villainy, and something that a “Robin Hood” guerilla must scrupulously avoid. In fact, these villainous acts are so destructive to the guerilla, that the authorities may be tempted to perform them on its own civilians in a “false flag” operation to blame the guerillas and to undermine public support for them. An attack on something that means little to the authorities’ actual power structure costs them little, but will do serious damage to the guerillas’ efforts. However, if the “Robin Hood” guerillas have already strongly established themselves and their reputation, such that it is common knowledge they would not attack defenseless civilian populations, the authorities will have an exceedingly difficult time blaming the guerillas for the “false flag” operations, despite any massive propaganda effort. Eventually, the truth of the authorities’ “false flag” operation will leak out, and, rather than damaging the guerillas’ reputation, it will become a tremendous victory for them.
A terrorist, a pirate or a savage differs greatly from a soldier, rebel, insurgent, or freedom fighter. Any combatant and his organization will not be known by their mere words or how they choose to label themselves. Rather, they will always be known by their deeds. Their reputation will be earned by their actions, which are easily understood by all rational human beings. An intelligent, learned, leader knows this and uses good reputation to his advantage to become a “Robin Hood” type of popular figure. The “Genghis Khan” approach is as effective in a modern armed conflict in this modern age as fighting modern armies with horses, bows, and arrows.
